Eastern Partnership: Aims and Results

Eastern Partnership: Aims and Results

When EU leaders gathered in Prague in May 2009, they framed the Eastern Partnership as a bold new chapter in Europe’s relations with its eastern neighbours. Six post-Soviet states were invited into a dedicated framework built on trade, reform and closer political ties. More than fifteen years on, we have to ask the uncomfortable question: has the Eastern Partnership delivered on its original promise, or has history simply overtaken it?

What Is the Eastern Partnership and Why Was It Created?

What Is the Eastern Partnership and Why Was It Created?

The Eastern Partnership (EaP) is a joint initiative between the European Union, its member states and six eastern European and South Caucasus countries. It was launched at the Prague Summit in May 2009, following a proposal from Poland and Sweden, and it sits within the broader European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The timing matters: the EU had just absorbed ten new members in 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, and Brussels wanted a structured way to engage with the countries that sat between the enlarged Union and Russia.

The Six Partner Countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine

The framework covers a genuinely diverse group. Armenia and Azerbaijan are in the South Caucasus; Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine sit in eastern Europe; Georgia straddles both categories geographically and politically. Their economies, political systems and foreign policy orientations differ sharply, which is one reason the EaP has always struggled to function as a single, coherent project.

From the European Neighbourhood Policy to a Dedicated Eastern Track

Before 2009, all of these countries were covered by the ENP, which also included Mediterranean partners. The problem was that a single neighbourhood policy could not address the specific security, energy and integration challenges of the eastern flank. The EaP created a dedicated eastern track with its own summits, ministerial meetings and flagship initiatives, while keeping the ENP’s core logic of conditionality: reform in exchange for closer ties.

The Polish-Swedish Proposal and the 2009 Prague Summit

Poland and Sweden drove the original proposal, with Warsaw in particular pushing for a framework that could eventually offer membership prospects, even if that language was carefully avoided in the final text. The Prague Summit established the basic architecture: bilateral tracks for each partner, multilateral platforms for cooperation, and a commitment to support political and economic reform. What it did not establish was a clear end goal.

The Core Aims: Association, Trade and Reform

From the outset, the EaP pursued a set of interlinked objectives: Association Agreements, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs), visa liberalisation, and support for democracy, the rule of law and energy security. Each was meant to reinforce the others, creating a virtuous circle in which economic integration and domestic reform pulled partners closer to EU standards.

Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas

Association Agreements are the most ambitious contractual instruments the EU offers short of membership. Paired with DCFTAs, they open access to the EU single market in exchange for regulatory alignment across a wide range of sectors. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia signed these agreements in 2014, and they entered into force in 2016 and 2017. Armenia and Azerbaijan pursued shallower arrangements, while Belarus never reached this stage.

Visa Liberalisation and Mobility Partnerships

Visa liberalisation became one of the EaP’s most visible and popular achievements. Moldova secured visa-free travel to the Schengen area in 2014, followed by Ukraine in 2017 and Georgia in 2017. These changes transformed everyday life for millions of citizens, making it easier to study, work and travel in the EU, and they gave governments a tangible political reward for difficult reforms.

Democracy, Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Conditionality

The EaP’s reform agenda has always been tied to conditionality. Progress on judicial independence, anti-corruption and media freedom determines how far integration can go. This has produced genuine successes, particularly in Moldova and Ukraine, but it has also exposed the limits of external pressure when domestic elites resist change.

What Has the Eastern Partnership Actually Achieved?

On paper, the record is substantial. Three partners have Association Agreements and DCFTAs in force, three enjoy visa-free travel, and two have moved from partner status to EU candidate status. In practice, the picture is far more uneven.

Trade Results: DCFTAs with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia

The DCFTAs have reshaped trade flows. The EU became Ukraine’s largest trading partner, and Moldovan and Georgian exporters diversified away from Russian markets. That said, implementation has been slow in places, and the benefits have not always reached smaller businesses or rural regions.

Visa-Free Travel for Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia

Visa liberalisation remains the EaP’s clearest win. For citizens of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, the ability to travel to the Schengen area without a visa is a daily reminder that the partnership delivers something concrete. It has also strengthened people-to-people contacts that underpin long-term political ties.

Ukraine and Moldova: From Partner to Candidate

The most dramatic shift came in June 2022, when Ukraine and Moldova were granted EU candidate status in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This was a geopolitical decision as much as a technical one, and it fundamentally changed the EaP’s logic: two of its members are now on a formal accession path, while others remain far behind.

Where the Eastern Partnership Has Fallen Short

Set against its original ambitions, the EaP has clear failures. Unresolved conflicts, Russian pressure and divergent domestic trajectories have strained the framework to breaking point.

Frozen Conflicts and Russian Pressure

Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain unresolved. The 2020 and 2023 wars over Nagorno-Karabakh displaced tens of thousands of Armenians and reshaped the region’s politics. Russia’s presence in these conflicts, whether as mediator or spoiler, has consistently limited what the EU can achieve.

Belarus: Suspension and Disengagement

Belarus suspended its participation in the EaP after the 2020 protests and the EU’s subsequent sanctions. Today it is effectively disengaged from the framework, and its alignment with Moscow makes any return to the EaP unlikely in the near term.

Armenia’s Drift Towards the Eurasian Economic Union

Armenia chose the Eurasian Economic Union over an Association Agreement with the EU in 2013, and it has remained a member ever since. More recently, Yerevan has distanced itself from Moscow, but its relationship with the EaP remains cautious and ambiguous.

The View from the UK: Why the Eastern Partnership Still Matters

We know that UK readers may wonder why a framework they left in 2020 still deserves attention. The answer is straightforward: the eastern neighbourhood shapes European security, energy prices and migration patterns, and Britain remains deeply engaged in the region even outside the EU.

Post-Brexit Britain and the Eastern Neighbourhood

The UK left the EU in 2020, but it has not left the neighbourhood. British diplomats continue to work with EaP partners bilaterally, and the UK has positioned itself as one of Ukraine’s most vocal supporters.

NATO, Sanctions and UK Support for Ukraine

Through NATO, sanctions and bilateral aid, the UK has supported Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion. Operation Interflex, the UK-led training programme for Ukrainian forces, has trained tens of thousands of recruits on British soil. Sanctions on Russian elites and entities have been coordinated with EU partners, even if the UK is no longer in the room when EU policy is made.

What UK Readers Should Watch Next

We would point to three things:

  • Whether the EU opens accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova at pace, and what that means for the EaP’s remaining members.
  • How the UK sustains its military and financial support for Ukraine if domestic political priorities shift.
  • Whether Armenia deepens ties with Brussels or continues to hedge between Russia, Turkey and the West.

The Future of the Eastern Partnership: Reform or Replacement?

The EaP now faces an existential question. Can a single framework hold together countries as different as Azerbaijan and Moldova, especially when two members are EU candidates and others are drifting away?

Differentiated Integration and the ‘Ring of Friends’ Problem

The old ‘ring of friends’ model assumed a shared destination. Today, differentiation is unavoidable: some partners want membership, others want trade, and some want nothing more than a working relationship. The EaP will have to accommodate that reality or lose relevance.

The 2025 and 2026 EaP Summits

The next summits will be decisive. If the EU cannot offer a credible path for candidate countries while keeping non-candidates engaged, the framework risks becoming a talking shop. We expect intense debate over how to balance these competing demands.

Could the Eastern Partnership Be Replaced?

Replacement is unlikely in the short term, but the EaP could be hollowed out from within. A more plausible scenario is a two-tier structure: an accession track for Ukraine, Moldova and possibly Georgia, and a cooperation track for Armenia and Azerbaijan, with Belarus effectively outside the framework altogether.

FAQ

When was the Eastern Partnership launched?

The Eastern Partnership was launched at the Prague Summit in May 2009, following a joint proposal from Poland and Sweden.

Which countries are part of the Eastern Partnership?

The six partner countries are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

Which EaP countries have visa-free travel to the Schengen area?

Moldova gained visa-free travel in 2014, followed by Ukraine and Georgia in 2017.

When did Ukraine and Moldova become EU candidates?

Ukraine and Moldova were granted EU candidate status in June 2022, in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Does the UK still engage with the Eastern Partnership after Brexit?

Yes. The UK left the EU in 2020 but continues to support Ukraine through military training, sanctions and bilateral aid, and it engages with the wider region through NATO and national diplomacy.

The Eastern Partnership has partly delivered on its original aims, but unevenly. Trade integration, visa liberalisation and, for Ukraine and Moldova, candidate status are real achievements. Yet frozen conflicts, Belarus’s disengagement and Armenia’s hedging show the limits of a single framework. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has forced the EU to rethink what the EaP is for, and the next few summits will determine whether it adapts or fades.

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